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Philosophical Introduction to Set Theory 
In the 1960s, progressive mathematics educators in the United States decided that elementary 
mathematics should be taught in a more conceptual fashion to accelerate the production of 
scientists and engineers able to meet the Soviet challenge in the Space Race. The curricular 
changes proposed by the “New Math” revolution introduced set theory early on (objects gathered 
into collections, one-to-one matching) as a basis for learning arithmetic, and they emphasized the 
importance of algebraic structure (commutativity, the distributive property). In hindsight, this 
may seem a somewhat peculiar and misguided strategy, but educators were drawing upon what 
they thought were the most modern views of the nature of mathematics as revealed during the 
first half of the 20th century by important foundational developments in set theory, logic, and 
abstract algebra. 
Stephen Pollard’s 1990 Philosophical Introduction to Set Theory, republished 25 years later in an 
inexpensive Dover paperback edition, shows no sympathy for connecting school mathematics to 
set theory; its emphasis goes in the other direction. Pollard repudiates the idea that being familiar 
with everyday collections, as promoted by New Math educators, is (or even can be) of genuine 
assistance in learning set theory, and he takes some pains to refute this myth. The concept of a 
mathematical set, according to Pollard, can only be obtained by studying set theory itself. One 
implicitly learns what a set is by working with the axioms, definitions, and theorems of set 
theory and by learning what the deductive limitations of various axiomatizations are. 
Pollard asserts (Chapter III) that everyday collections differ from mathematical sets in several 
key respects. One difference is whether the empty set should be considered a collection (since 
nothing is being collected); this problem parallels one mathematicians faced earlier in deciding 
whether 0 was a number. A more crucial issue, Pollard argues at some length, is the fact that 
commonsense collection usage does not allow collections themselves to be taken as members of 
higher-level collections. This is certainly true for the most part, for such constructions are rarely 
needed in everyday life — though baseball fans will point out that teams are members of 
leagues, not their players, so there is at least a simple commonplace instance where a set of sets 
occurs. Furthermore, it took logicians and mathematicians themselves some time to distinguish 
between set membership and class inclusion, as well as between single elements and singletons, 
but this doesn’t mean that they weren’t dealing with some version of a set concept prior to when 
set theory received its first axiomatization by Zermelo in 1908. 
Besides arguing that everyday collections are different in nature from mathematical sets, Pollard 
argues that history of mathematics supports his perspective. Set theory did not evolve from 
considering pluralities (the Greek notion of number), he says, but arose within 19th century real 
analysis. And here it was not due to a concern with finite collections but with various infinite 
point sets that Cantor explored as he investigated the convergence of Fourier series. Cantor’s 
discovery of a mathematical purpose for distinguishing different types of infinite sets is what led 
to his developing a theory of (transfinite) sets. 
This contextualization of set theory is certainly true, but Pollard spends an entire chapter 
(Chapter II) exploring the back history of analysis — dipping into the Middle Ages (the Oxford 
Calculators and Oresme), looking at the rise of symbolic algebra (Viète) and analytic geometry 
(Descartes), touching on 17th, 18th, and 19th century debates over the nature of a function — 
before finally arriving at how set theory developed out of Cantor’s research in analysis. Like me, 
the reader may wonder whether all this earlier history is pertinent, but I appreciate the 
recognition that philosophizing shouldn’t be done in a historical vacuum. Interestingly enough, 
this seems to be the way others are also doing philosophy of set theory (cf. Mary Tiles in her 
1989 The Philosophy of Set Theory, and Penelope Maddy in her 2011 Defending the Axioms: On 
the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory). 
Pollard sees set theory as the reigning foundation of mathematics (and thus an essential topic for 
any philosophy of mathematics), though he briefly discusses the more recent challenge of 
category theory for this role, admitting that a time may eventually come when set theory’s 
hegemony is broken. His reasons for sticking with set theory are mainly that it has provided 
fertile conceptual tools and terminology for a wide variety of subfields of mathematics, unifying 
a very diverse theoretical landscape, and that it provides a central theory in which mainstream 
theories of mathematics can be nicely interpreted (set-theoretic reductionism). 
Pollard expounds his position on set theory by devoting roughly equal time to philosophical and 
technical matters. In the latter vein, chapters IV and VII provide logical interludes that discuss 
the notions of theory interpretability and the relation of second order logic and plural 
quantification to set theory respectively; chapter VI considers some metamathematics associated 
with the membership relation and the successor function; and chapter VIII, augmented by two 
appendices, explores the structures of iterative hierarchies for set theory. His discussion of 
various philosophical issues and outlooks inevitably expands on some of these technical matters 
as well. 
Using some ideas of Michael Dummett, chapter V presents an extended argument in favor of 
adopting a formalist outlook on set theory. Oversimplifying this somewhat, having rejected any 
pre-theoretical or realistic Platonic basis for understanding mathematical sets or set membership, 
Pollard concludes that our knowledge of sets derives solely from our deductive development of 
the axioms and definitions of set theory and from discovering the deductive constraints 
(incompleteness and undecidability results) on such theories. In fact, the proper tasks of a set 
theorist are encapsulated in these deductive activities; the structures of interest to the set theorist 
are the theories themselves, not any supposed universe of sets existing independently of our 
theorizing. Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis, therefore, has no objective truth value outside of 
some axiomatic theory about large sets. 
While Pollard believes he has presented formalism as “a genuinely compelling philosophical 
outlook,” he realizes that this outlook is not accepted by everyone doing research into set theory 
nor by mathematicians in general. He therefore concludes his book in chapter IX by briefly 
sketching the outlines of an alternative, structuralist philosophy of set theory, which may better 
capture the thinking of practicing mathematicians. Here Pollard draws upon the work of Michael 
Resnik in particular. Since a mathematical theory is unable to distinguish between its isomorphic 
models, we should consider such theories, he says, as studying the abstract structure of all such 
models (a notion that fits well with considering category theory as foundational). The objects 
being studied should be thought of as abstract entities within such a structure, whose features are 
only those specified within the theory. Sets should thus be considered as positions within the set-
theoretic hierarchy axiomatized by some theory, and nothing more. 
The reader can decide whether such an alternative viewpoint truly provides a viable counter to 
the formalism Pollard espoused earlier in the book (one may now take a realist view of abstract 
structures, if not the entities they contain). Pollard recognizes in the concluding paragraph that 
this perspective needs to be fleshed out further, but he believes it holds promise for solving 
problems in the philosophy of set theory in particular and mathematics in general. 
 
 
